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Closed policy networks, broken chains of communication and 
the stories behind an ‘entrepreneurial policy’: The case of 
NHS Local Improvement Finance Trust (NHS LIFT) 
 
Dr. Rachel E. Aldred 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article draws on original case study research to develop more general 
conclusions about policy-making processes under New Labour. I discuss the Local 
Improvement Finance Trust (LIFT) as an exemplar of new trends in contemporary 
capitalist welfare regimes, and I compare some of the enterprise rhetoric surrounding 
and justifying LIFT to the experiences of National Health Service managers and 
clinicians in my case study. I consider why many of the voices that I studied appear 
to remain unheard outside private interviews and meetings, and conclude that 
changes in the public sector are helping to create closed networks that are 
unresponsive to concerns expressed ‘on the ground’. Finally, I consider some 
implications of my data for the future of neo-liberal welfare policies. 
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Introduction 
 
As ex-UK Health Minister Alan Milburn told the PPP Forum1 (Milburn, 2004: 1), 
‘PPPs [public–private partnerships] have become embedded as a core part of the 
government’s modernisation programme for the public services’. PPP is a loose term, 
but Milburn’s phrase reflects the growing involvement of large private companies at 
all levels of public service organization in the UK, particularly England. In the National 
Health Service (NHS), the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) accounts for a large 
majority of new capital spending on hospitals (Pollock, 2004). PFI involves private 
sector consortia financing, building and maintaining NHS hospitals, running ‘non-
core’ services (which may range from cleaning to pathology). The private sector is 
being invited to provide previously sacrosanct clinical services; current primary care 
reforms originally sought to remove direct provision of primary care services from the 
NHS organizations now running them, primary care trusts (PCTs). Although this has 
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been partially withdrawn following protests, a key government aspiration remains 
what is now called ‘diversity of provision’ in all aspects of health care (Hewitt, 2005). 
 
Alongside this dramatic turn towards PPP in health and welfare financing and 
provision, there has been a medium-term shift in government discourse about public 
services. The concept of ‘enterprise’ is prominent, and social policy is conceived in 
economic terms (Fairclough, 2000). What role do policy networks play in this 
development of PPP in practice and theory? And what light can such ‘really existing’ 
coalitions shed on the positive features often attached to network organization (Hay, 
1998)? 
 
Such questions are highly relevant to the PPP government–industry nexus, as recent 
years have seen a proliferation of think tanks and other organizations broadly 
supportive of these developments (from Reform to the New Health Network). Existing 
organizations have been enrolled into new networks expressing the changing 
configurations of power (Rhodes, 1997). The UK’s public audit body, the National 
Audit Office (NAO) is a case in point. Auditor General Sir John Bourn’s (2003) 
keynote speech at the PPP Forum argued that: 
 
PFI and PPP are the vehicle of the 21st century. They are the way in 
which public services will be delivered increasingly in the United 
Kingdom and throughout the world. . . . It’s a great opportunity for all 
of us to show to the world, that in this area as in so many, what Britain 
does is of the highest quality that can make a real difference 
throughout the world. 
 
I would argue that this speech suggests the growth of closed networks surrounding 
PPP, including senior politicians and managers, but excluding many who will actually 
have to make policies work. Linked to this are broken chains of communication. 
Assisted by ‘commercial confidentiality’ which often keeps the progress of contracts 
secret, information fails to travel between local and national publics, and the state at 
different levels. Many war reporters are now ‘embedded’ within military networks. In 
an analogous manner, PPP industries create their own networks excluding and/or 
assimilating potential threats, inhibiting criticism on the domestic front. This article 
addresses the dysfunctionality of such networks and their role in the development of 
a flourishing, yet unpopular, policy. 
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LIFT and the case study 
 
NHS Local Improvement Finance Trust (LIFT), a series of over fifty PPP companies 
formed to modernize primary care premises, is an ideal example through which to 
explore such processes. It contains many features that may herald the future 
development of welfare regimes under advanced neo-liberalism, suggesting some 
contradiction and discontinuities within these developments. And it may help answer 
the question of how neo-liberalism has been so successful, despite continued public 
support for publicly provided welfare. 
 
With these aims in mind, I have conducted an in depth case study of one LIFT area; 
an early scheme, which progressed to financial close relatively quickly, without any 
significant opposition being raised. Over the course of twelve months, I interviewed 
key players in local organizations (four PCTs, one mental health trust, a local 
authority, the LIFT company, its backers), local general practitioners (GPs) with 
experience of LIFT, and informants from several other LIFT areas and relevant 
national organizations (thirty interviews in total). I observed a similar number of local 
and national meetings and seminars discussing LIFT (some private, some public) 
and collected a library of related documents. This empirical work is the centrepiece of 
my doctoral research entitled ‘Public-Private Partnerships and the Changing Nature 
of the ‘‘Public’’ in the Global Economy’, which is funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (grant number PTA-030-2003-01709). 
 
The methodology combines ethnography and critical discourse analysis, in order to 
‘look at interpretations of texts as well as texts themselves, and more generally at 
how texts practically figure in particular areas of social life’ (Fairclough, 2003: 15). 
This critical realist approach seeks to triangulate data from different sources 
(interviews, observations, documentary analysis), while anticipating that texts and 
participants may employ different representations of LIFT, according to their locations 
within networks and organizations. QSR NVivo 2.0 has been used to store and 
analyse data; data used in this article have been selected to exemplify recurrent 
themes in interviewees’ talk about LIFT (e.g. risk and flexibility). 
 
LIFT and the reorganization of welfare 
 
The LIFT initiative now covers half of England, with Scotland due to follow. LIFT has 
many affinities with PFI in its ‘design, build and operate’ structure. A specially created 
LIFT company (‘LIFTCo’) designs, builds and operates health centres, mostly using 
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debt finance, and leases them back to NHS and other tenants. The LIFT company 
provides certain services to the building’s users. But despite these similarities, LIFT 
is more radical than PFI, potentially giving the private sector much more control over 
welfare. 
 
First, LIFT is not merely a contract to build one building, or group of buildings. It 
involves an ‘exclusivity clause’ giving a LIFT company an exclusive right to build 
primary care premises for PCTs in the LIFT area. This exclusivity clause was 
requested by the private sector during an initial consultation (PWC, 2001). LIFT is 
intended to be a ‘population based scheme’, not an ‘asset based scheme’. Rather 
than simply building and managing specific buildings, the private sector will help plan 
health care strategy for the local area over the 20-year Strategic Partnering 
Agreement. As the Department of Health’s LIFT prospectus states (DH, 2001: 18), it 
will be ‘a partner that will not only deliver and manage services and implement 
investments, but also work with the local health commissioners and service providers 
to plan future needs and requirements, and how they can best be delivered’. 
 
Secondly, LIFT involves a public sector shareholding: local NHS bodies will own 20 
per cent of the LIFT company, with national PPP Partnerships for Health (PfH) 
owning another 20 per cent. There are two purposes for this shareholding. It is 
supposed to encourage a feeling of ‘ownership’ among public sector managers: 
although 60 per cent privately owned, LIFT companies are meant to be seen as part 
of the NHS structure. As a senior manager from PfH told me: ‘it’s a bit like, why 
would you own a substantial shareholding in a property development company, and 
then want to go and ask somebody else to go and develop property for you?’  
 
The public sector shareholding also aims to bring commercial imperatives into the 
heart of NHS decision-making. Criticisms that this creates a conflict of interest (NAO, 
2005) were brushed aside by PfH. Such supporters of LIFT encourage the 
dissolution of traditional boundaries between the public and the private sector. As 
one interviewee from a private company involved in LIFT told me, without these close 
connections ‘PCTs would potentially be developing schemes in isolation from the 
commercial realities of where land is available and how a development might better 
be brought together with social services’ (my emphasis). The public sector 
shareholding is meant to ensure that NHS bodies think about maximizing profitability: 
‘The LIFT will also look to maximise third party income; provided there are no ethical 
or service conflicts’ (DH, 2001: 26). 
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The public sector shareholding ensures that funds are merged; public and private 
sector capital sits in the same investment vehicle (LIFTCo). Other measures ensure 
that public and private sector personnel inhabit the same spaces, and move in the 
same circles. An NHS representative sits on the board of the LIFT company. 
Conversely, private sector representatives sit on the Strategic Partnering Board 
which takes a strategic overview of developments across the LIFT area. The Board 
works to implement a Strategic Services Development Plan, which is to be written by 
representatives of the LIFT company and the NHS. Senior managers from public and 
private sectors are present at a range of meetings and events related to LIFT. What 
PfH call ‘double-hatting’ is meant to promote managerial identities appropriate to this 
hybrid space, where the private sector helps plan welfare services, and the public 
sector thinks ‘commercially’. 
 
A new stage of capitalism? 
 
Bob Jessop (1994), among others, has argued that we have entered a new stage of 
capitalist development characterized by a shift away from the national Keynesian 
welfare state. This welfare state created no-go areas for private capital such as the 
NHS, spaces dedicated not to the interests of particular capitalist firms or sectors, but 
to the reproduction of capitalist society more generally (Gough, 1979). The NHS was 
never totally separate from private capitalist interests, and in recent times this has 
increased, with the growing power of Big Pharma2 and the contracting out of ‘support 
services’. But for many people it embodies a logic opposed to private capital: 
providing services for the whole population, with (in theory) no payments or profits 
involved. 
 
The government’s NHS reforms increasingly bring market logics into the service. For 
‘payment by results’, this is obvious: the NHS has been split into providers and 
purchasers, and purchasers buy procedures from providers. For LIFT, it is not so 
clear. In a web page aimed at members of the public, the Department of Health (DH, 
n.d.) presents LIFT as a remedy for market failure, pointing out that in general, 
individual GPs, rather than the NHS, have owned primary care premises. 
 
But in practice, LIFT may often privatize public assets: in my case study, most 
projects under way involve a publicly owned site being sold to the private sector. 
These sites were perceived as easier to access than private sector land: a PCT chief 
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executive acknowledged that ‘in terms of practically getting the early schemes going, 
that was the quickest and easiest’. Also, GP-owned premises tend to be smaller, and 
refurbishing them may be less attractive to the private sector than large-scale new 
builds. As one NHS manager told me: 
 
‘The construction schemes that we’ve asked LIFT to get involved with, 
namely around refurbishment, is not something that they push forward 
very quickly. Because it’s not particularly very profitable, and not what 
they want to do.’ 
 
Furthermore, although transferring buildings from GPs to LIFTCos would not involve 
the sale of publicly owned assets, it would be part of a growing corporatization or 
supermarketization of capitalist society. Like privatization, supermarketization is an 
important trend affecting welfare. When the NHS was set up in 1948, the key 
countervailing powers were perceived to be privileged professionals. Since then, the 
pharmaceutical industry has grown massively, now representing some of Britain’s 
(and the world’s) most powerful companies. Other industries have grown up around 
the health care sector: in the UK, oligopolistic subcontracting chains dominate the 
PFI industry; bank, construction and facilities management companies locked in a 
mutually beneficial embrace. 
 
LIFT companies will be closely connected to the global marketplace. The actual 
owners of primary care premises are not LIFT companies themselves, but different 
holding companies (FundCos) within the LIFT company structure. This means, 
according to the LIFTCo general manager in the case study, that ‘if any one project 
changes hands, that doesn’t then alter the economics of the others’. The structure is 
designed to make individual projects easier to sell on the secondary market. As an 
NAO auditor told me, it made the LIFT structure ‘more commercial’ than PFI; more 
like a property portfolio than a special purpose vehicle, so more connected to global 
property markets. 
 
LIFT also represents a shift in the way governments contract with private firms: from 
short-term, discrete contracts, to long-term, complex and open-ended contracts 
(Lawson and Taylor-Gooby, 1993). This is linked to the consolidation of markets in 
public services. The government recently announced a deal to alleviate the two-tier 
system in the NHS, caused by contractors taking on new staff on worse terms and 
conditions than employees who transferred from the NHS. The deal was welcomed 
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by the Business Services’ Association representing major contractors: partly because 
the public sector is footing the £75 million bill, but also because the agreement 
increases barriers to market entry. Similarly, such companies welcome the long term 
stability and guaranteed cash flow offered by PPP. 
 
LIFT in practice 
 
Arguments in support of LIFT praise its flexibility: the NAO (2005: 20) claims that 
LIFT is ‘an effective and flexible procurement mechanism’. This fits well with the 
entrepreneurialist ideology often used to legitimate LIFT. For example, a senior 
manager from PfH told me that ‘typically it’s the easiest thing in the world for a 
primary care trust to identify a need, oh and we have a site, and this is how we’re 
going to do it. And only then do you involve the private sector. LIFT allows the private 
sector to be involved right from here onwards. To say – well, do you really think that’s 
the right idea? Have you thought about doing this instead?’ In this discourse, private 
companies provide innovative ideas at an early stage in the planning process. 
 
By contrast, the public sector is cast as bureaucratic, old-fashioned and irrational. A 
private sector representative told me ‘Most people in the public sector, the way they 
do it, they’re used to separate organisations, aren’t they? You go to the Education 
Authority for the school, you go to the health people for your health, you go to the 
local authority for your housing and we’ve all grown up very used to that kind of 
structure. And all of those organisations tend to act in a very independent way. Which 
actually is a bit mad.’ A private sector consultant was more forceful: ‘the NHS is 
dying, because they’re not able to change – that’s what the whole modernisation 
agenda is about. And those that are able to change and adapt and work with the new 
opportunities are the ones that will survive. Whereas the ones that will refuse to 
change are the ones that will inevitably get caught up in the system and will 
disappear.’ 
 
However, talking to local NHS managers and clinicians involved in LIFT, a different 
picture emerged, casting doubt on the claim that flexibility is a property of the LIFT 
initiative. Analysts should ask: flexibility for what, and for whom? The LIFT structure 
allows flexibility for capital to move in and out of holding companies, but this does not 
equate to flexibility in service provision. GPs were worried about the difficulty of 
altering a LIFT-owned building; even minor changes must be carried out by the LIFT 
company. A GP working in a LIFT centre told me: ‘There are about two or three of 
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the rooms need some minor modifications. And the bills that have come back, the 
estimates that have come back are absolutely exorbitant, in my opinion. To convert a 
simple room from a storage space into a clinical room isn’t a lot of work. A bit of 
decoration, maybe a bit of carpet, telephone point being put in. And the bill came into 
the thousands!’ 
 
Other local interviewees contradicted claims that LIFT breaks down bureaucratic 
barriers. The ‘independent chair’ (not attached to the public or private sector 
shareholders) of the LIFT company board said that in the short term, LIFT is not 
quicker: ‘I think in the short term, it just makes a lot more hoops that you’ve got to 
jump through. Because it’s one more layer of bureaucracy frankly. But, you know, at 
the moment, it’s the only game in town. If they want new capital facilities, that is the 
route to get them. There is no alternative that’s available.’ A local GP commented: 
‘This is a very, very bureaucratic process. This is significantly and heavily 
management-led. And all the tenants are kept out of it, until the last moment.’ A 
mental health trust director: ‘We find at the moment the process is very slow.’ A 
primary care trust director: ‘I do feel [LIFT] has been a lot more complex.’ 
 
A primary care trust director was sceptical about the idea that LIFT brought 
entrepreneurial skills to the NHS: ‘They’re there to bring in the private sector 
entrepreneurial approach to development. But I have to say I haven’t seen any of that 
in evidence yet. And I don’t have a great deal of confidence that the people that are 
in place will ever do that.’ 
 
Other managers complained that the private sector was excessively cautious, rather 
than innovative. A local authority manager said ‘[LIFTCo] want the GP surgery that 
we were going to develop, with nothing really added, maybe a community room or 
whatever. So that in effect, the project is simple and can be run very quickly. And 
that’s what they’ve continued to want for some time. Because they need to get some 
sort of quantum before it’s worthwhile taking risks. But I’m not sure when we’ll ever 
get to the position where we can actually take these broader risks.’ The banks, in 
particular, were perceived as being risk averse: ‘There’s something like twenty-five 
percent performance bonds that are expected [by the banks], where normally, they’d 
have expected a ten percent performance bond. We’re paying for all of that, any 
insurances and stuff like that’ (mental health trust director). 
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Another example of risk aversion is that in my LIFT case study (and, to my 
knowledge, in all other areas), LIFTCo does not lease surgery space directly to GPs. 
Originally, this was the intention: the Department of Health website states ‘[LIFTCo] 
will rent accommodation to GPs on a lease basis . . . NHS LIFTs will offer GPs 
flexible lease arrangements’ (DH, n.d.). The PriceWaterhouseCoopers consultation 
paper argued that the NHS would benefit from this in two ways: it would pass on 
demand risk and become better able to manage relationships with GPs. ‘The key 
objective of the NHS to develop flexible relationships with the local GPs as part of 
primary care PPP’s could be facilitated by passing an element of demand risk 
through to the private sector’ (PWC, 2001: 18). But instead, PCTs have taken 
headleases on LIFT properties, and sublet to GPs. The NHS, not the private sector, 
has been willing and able to offer flexible terms to GPs, but this means that the NHS 
bears the risk of GPs leaving or defaulting. 
 
Some conclusions 
 
In my case study, I have found evidence to question some of the arguments in 
support of LIFT. More limited research into another three LIFT areas revealed (to 
greater or lesser extents) similar issues arising. Rather than ‘freeing up enterprise’, 
LIFT creates large, legalistic, and bureaucratic systems, which lock the NHS into 
particular buildings and services for extended periods of time. However, such 
concerns have largely failed to reach the public, locally or nationally. Despite the 
worries expressed by clinicians that I interviewed, neither the British Medical 
Association nor the Medical Practitioners’ Union has taken a stance against LIFT, 
and I was told that the issue was not discussed at the national conference of Local 
Medical Committees. 
 
Similarly, the NAO report on LIFT concluded (NAO, 2005: 2) ‘at national level LIFT is 
an attractive way of securing improvements in primary and social care. The local 
LIFT schemes we have examined appear to be effective and offer value for money.’ 
This is despite worries expressed by a variety of organizations (NAO, 2005: 21): 
‘Representatives from the National Pharmaceutical Association, the British Dental 
Association and Local Authorities told us they had concerns over rental costs. There 
is a common perception from these groups of prospective tenants that the higher 
cost of LIFT, compared to current rent payments, outweighs the benefits of new, 
purpose built premises.’ Instead, the NAO seems to have privileged the responses of 
Project Directors and private sector bidders: the people who are most likely to give 
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favourable accounts. Unusually, two Members of Parliament sitting on the Commons 
Select Committee for Public Accounts criticized the NAO report (for similar reasons). 
 
When I began the case study, I expected to find that local NHS managers had been 
ideologically enrolled into the LIFT project. Instead, it appears that the organizational 
networks surrounding LIFT have developed in a way that muffles criticism or even 
suggestions for improvement. At a LIFT forum, one speaker said plaintively ‘It’s very 
difficult if you’ve got news about things in LIFT that can be made better – and I am 
positive about LIFT – to find a forum to discuss them.’ Patients’ Forums, which 
replaced Community Health Councils, seem less well equipped to evaluate the 
effects of government policies. Senior government figures have grown close to senior 
private sector figures, and partnership is interpreted as silencing criticism as in PfH’s 
(n.d.) stern warning at the start of the LIFT Strategic Partnering Agreement: 
 
All parties are reminded that LIFT is a true partnership in every sense 
of the word and the value of further debate over insubstantial issues 
should be considered in this light. Both PfH and the public sector 
shall thereby be positively motivated to work with the private sector to 
avoid or mitigate the impact of any issues that may arise over the 
lifetime of the project. 
 
However, these closed networks and broken chains of communication could cause 
multiple fissures in the welfare state. They may be leading to crises of effectiveness: 
in my LIFT case study area, projects have stalled in two out of three primary care 
trusts. LIFT may also lead to legitimation crises, if it is seen to prioritize private 
companies’ needs over those of the NHS. But the outcome of such crises is far from 
certain. Colin Leys (2005) has accused the UK government of trying to turn back the 
clock to a pre-war, market based health system. Crises in the NHS could actually be 
used to speed up this process, on the grounds that the existing system has failed. 
Struggles lie ahead over who is to be blamed for increasing financial and political 
instabilities. They are likely to have implications beyond the UK and the NHS. 
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Notes 
 
1. An industry group that promotes the benefits of PPPs. 
2. The multinational pharmaceutical industry, which contains some major 
British companies. 
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